My Research

Number Theory, Cryptography, and Quantum Computing.

While all three of these fields might seem unrelated, they coalesce into the booming research area of post-quantum cryptography. As humans, we are in a unique place in our current understanding of computability and algorithmic complexity. Nobody quite understands what computers are capable of. Some problems we can solve very quickly even with our slowest computers, some problems seem take millennia to solve for even the best computers, and some problems are provable unsolvable by any computer. To make things even more interesting, emerging quantum computing technology has theoretical hope to push the bounds of what is able to be computed quickly.

My goal as a researcher is to developing algorithms, both quantum and classical, that advance our understanding of computer science and mathematics. I am particularly interesting in Hilbert’s tenth problem, isogeny-based cryptography, and the underlying problems in lattice-based cryptography.


Deciding if a Genus 1 Curve has a Rational Point (Thesis)

Author: Nic Swanson

Many sources suggest a folklore procedure to determine if a smooth curve of genus 1 has a rational point. This procedure terminates conditionally on the Tate-Shafarevich conjecture. In this thesis, we provide an exposition for this procedure, making several steps explicit. In some instances, we also provide MAGMA implementations of the subroutines. In particular, we give an algorithm to determine if a smooth, genus 1 curve of arbitrary degree is locally soluble, we compute its Jacobian, and we give an exposition for descent in our context. Additionally, we prove there exists an algorithm to decide if smooth, genus 1 curve has a rational point if and only if there exists an algorithm to compute the Mordeil-Weil group of an elliptic curve.

May, 2024

Published: Virginia Tech ETDs.


Masking Countermeasures Against Side-Channel Attacks on Quantum Computers (Preprint)

Authors: Jason LeGrow, Travis Morrison, Jamie Sikora, and Nic Swanson.

We propose a modification to the transpiler of a quantum computer to safeguard against side-channel attacks. More broadly, we demonstrate that if it is feasible to shield a specific subset of gates from side-channel attacks, then it is possible to conceal all information in a quantum algorithm with only a linear increase in overhead. We provide concrete examples of this protection, specifically with virtual gates on IBM’s quantum computers, which are undetectable to previously studied side-channel attacks.

February, 2024


A Lower Bound on the Failed Zero Forcing Number of Graph

Authors: Eric Ufferman and Nic Swanson.

As an undergraduate research project, I studied a graph isomorphism invariant called the failed zero forcing number. In our paper, we give a tight lower bound on the failed zero forcing number and provide some computations classifying graphs with small failed zero forcing number.

May, 2022